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tion 14 (a) relating to misleading advertising of injurious foods and drugs,
there would be little point in the addition of the new sections, since the over-
whelming majority of cases falling within these provisions could have been
brought within the amended section 5. There is also some logic in the conten-
tion that the criminal penalties could have been more easily provided for by
amending the Pure Food and Drug Act to include advertisements as well as
labels. Of course, there will be need for considerable judicial construction of
the amended Act. In retrospect, its defects, if any, are confined to attempting




Dividends Subject to Apportionment Under the Doctrine of
Earp's Appeal
The general topic of the "Pennsylvania" doctrine of Earp's Appeal 1 and
its modem developments has been the subject of extended discussion.2  By way
of summary, it may be said that in construing a will whereby a testator leaves
shares of corporate stock in trust, providing simply that the income should go
to one beneficiary for life with remainder over,3 the courts have handled the
problem of allocation of dividends in a number of ways. In Kentucky, for in-
stance, all dividends of any sort declared from surplus during the period of the
trust go to the life tenant regardless of when the surplus was accumulated.
4
According to the "Massachusetts" rule, on the other hand, all cash dividends
are awarded to the life beneficiary and all stock dividends to the corpus.5 Penn-
sylvania and several other states 6 have rejected these rules of thumb and have
provided that all proceeds in liquidation and certain dividends from earnings
shall be apportioned between life tenant and remainderman. The aim of such
apportionment is to allocate to the life tenant all payments arising from earn-
I. 28 Pa. 368 (1857).
2. The clearest and most comprehensive treatment of the law on this subject will
be found in 4 BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES (935) f§ 841-857. Other recommended
expositions and collections of cases can be found in: Nirdlinger's Estate, 29o Pa.
457, 139 Atl. 200 (I9O7); HowEs, INCOME AND PRINCIPAL. (i905) 17-49; i MOR-
WETZ, PRIVATE CORPORATIONS (2d ed. 1886) §§ 465-471; 2 PERRY, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES
(7th ed. 1929) 1§ 544-546d; Brigham, Pennsylvania Rules Governing the Allocation
of Receipts Derived by Trustees from Shares of Stock (937) 85 U. OF PA. L. REV.
358; Notes (1923) 23 COL. L. REv. 369, (193o) 44 HAEv. L. REV. 101, (935) 83 U. OF PA.
L. REv. 773; (937) 46 YALE L. J. 552; Notes (1892) 16 L. R. A. 461, (907) 12 L. R. A.
(N. s.) 768, (91) 35 L. R. A. (N. s.) 563, (914) 5o L. R. A. (N. s.) 51o, L. R. A. i9i6D
21i, (1923) 24 A. L. R. 9, (1926) 42 A. L. R. 448, (1927) 5o A. L. R. 375, (1928) 56 A. L.
R. 1287, (1929) 59 A. L. R. 1532, (931) 72 A. L. R. 981, (i933) 83 A. L. R. 1261, (1936)
xoi A. L. R. 1379.
3. If the intent of the testator is expressly stated in the will, it is of course controlling if
legal. Robinson's Trust, 218 Pa. 481, 67 Atl. 775 (19o7) ; see Jones v. Integrity Trust Co.,
292 Pa. I49, 156, 14o Atl. 862, 864 (1928).
L. REV. 773, (937) 46 YALE_ L. J. 552; Notes (1892) 16 L. R. A. 461, (907) 12 L. R. A.
4. Hite v. Hite, 93 Ky. 257, 20 S W. 778 (1892) ; Hubley v. Wolfe, 259 Ky. 574, 82 S.
W. (2d) 830 (I935) (300% stock dividend and large cash dividend from earnings which
accrued to the corporation before the creation of the trust all awarded to tenant).
5. Minot v. Paine, 99 Mass. ioi (i868) ; Powell v. Madison Safe Deposit and Trust
Co., 208 Ind. 432, 196 N. E. 324 (i935).
6. 4 BOGERT, op. cit. supra note 2, § 85o, lists the following jurisdictions as having adopted
the Pennsylvania rule: California, Delaware, Iowa, Maryland, New Jersey, South Carolina,
Tennessee, Vermont, Wisconsin, Hawaii.
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ings of the corporation during the trust period, and to preserve for the corpus
the intact value (usually the book value) of the shares as of the date when the
trust was created, plus any pur~ly capital gains.
7
What can properly be considered a liquidation of capital assets in this
respect is a separate problem." Here, we are concerned only with what divi-
dends from earnings are to be apportioned under the Pennsylvania rule. Al-
though the courts of New Jersey have shown a tendency to apportion dividends
of any sort,9 it has generally been held elsewhere that only extraordinary divi-
dends are apportionable," ° while ordinary dividends go to the person entitled to
the income of the estate at the date of declaration without investigation into
their source. 1 A determination of what is meant by the terms ordinary and
extraordinary in this connection would seem to be an important prerequisite to
the satisfactory operation of the apportionment rule. The common understand-
ing of the phrases is becoming increasingly confused as a result of the growing
tendency on the part of many corporations to adopt an irregular dividend policy.
Dividends at a fixed and uniform rate are becoming rare; in many instances it
has become "the ordinary practice of the corporation to declare a series of ex-
traordinary dividends". 12 Coincident with this development, the Pennsylvania
7. See Evans, Calculating the Distribution of a Stock Dividend Between Life Tenant
and Corpus (1929) 77 U. OF PA. L. REv. 981. It makes no difference, of course, if the trust
is inter vivos; and it has been held that the same rules are applicable as between successive
life beneficiaries. Graham's Estate, 296 Pa. 436, 146 Atl. III (1929) ; Neafie's Estate, 325
Pa. 561, 191 Atl. 56 (937). No distinctions along these lines will be made in this Note.
Literally speaking, an apportionment occurs only when a dividend is earned by the cor-
poration partly during and partly before the trust period. In this discussion, however, the
term will be used as synonymous with allocation according to date of earning; thus, the
term will be applied without distinction to those cases where the dividend was earned by the
corporation wholly before the creation of the trust and awarded in its entirety to the remain-
derman.
8. The simplest case of liquidation is, of course, the dissolution of the corporation.
Whether there has been a partial liquidation is often difficult to decide-as in the case of
dividends from the depletion reserve of a mining company, In re Knox's Estate, 195 Atl. 28
(Pa. 1937) ; or of proceeds from the sale of land by a land company. Matter of Jackson,
258 N. Y. 281, 179 N. E. 496 (1932). For discussion of these and other complications, see
4 BOGERT, op. cit. supra note 2, § 855; Brigham: Pennsylvania Rules Governing the Alloca-
tion of Receipts Derived by Trustees from Wasting Property, (1938) 86 U. OF PA. L. REV.
471. A sale of stock by the trustee has been held a "liquidation" of the estate's interest in
the corporation, hence an occasion for apportionment. Matter of Schaefer, 178 App. Div.
117, 165 N. Y. Supp. ig (ist Dep't, 1917) ; Nirdlinger's Estate, 290 Pa. 457, 139 Atl. 200
(1927), Note (1928) 76 U. OF PA. L. REv. 589.
9. In Lang v. Lang, 57 N. J. Eq. 325, 41 Atl. 705 (1898), it was held that all dividends,
ordinary and extraordinary, should be apportioned. Dividends admittedly ordinary were
apportioned according to date of earnings in: Hewitt v. Hewitt, 113 N. J. Eq. 299, 166 Atl.
528 (Ch. i3i); City Bank Farmers' Trust Co. v. McCarter, iii N. J. Eq. 315, 162 Atl. 274
(I932) ; Graves v. Graves, 115 N. J. Eq. 547, 171 Ati. 681 (1934). But such apportionment
of ordinary dividends was refused in: National Newark and Essex Banking Co. v. Work,
lO9 N. J. Eq. 468, 158 Atl. lO9 (Ch. 1932) ; Bankers Trust Co. v. Lobdell, 116 N. 3. Eq. 363,
173 At. 918 (Ch. 1934) (per diem apportionment of first ordinary dividend). Apparently
the law of New Jersey is still unsettled on this point; see Oldn and Brandchaft, Problens of
Trust Administration in New Jersey (1935) 4 MERcER BEASLEY L. REV. 31, 147, at 151.
io. Flaccus's Estate, 283 Pa. 185, 129 Atl. 74 (1925).
ii. Opperman's Estate (No. I), 319 Pa. 455, 179 Atl. 729 (1935) (ordinary dividends
not apportionable in the absence of "unusual circumstances'-i. e. a liquidating dividend; see
supra note 8) ; In re Knox's Estate, 195 Atl. 28 (Pa. 1937). Cf. Matter of Villard, 147
Misc. 472, 264 N. Y. Supp. 236 (Surr. Ct. 1933). See infra notes 42 and 45.
12. Brigham, supra note 2, at 370. This tendency was noted in Matter of Osborne, 209
N. Y. 450, 474, 103 N. E. 723, 730 (1913). It has been augmented recently by the tax on
undistributed profits, 49 STAT. 1655 (1936), 26 U. S. C. A. § I3a (Supp. 1936). The same
law, however, will possibly simplify apportionment problems by reducing the number of sur-
pluses accumulated over long periods of years.
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view, once generally approved by legal commentators, has fallen from favor.,-
Inasmuch as the apportionment doctrine is usually criticized for its impractica-
bility and for the burden of uncertainty it places upon trustees,14 it would seem
desirable to clarify the doctrine wherever possible. Admitting the impossibility
of finding a test which would determine automatically whether a given dividend
is ordinary or extraordinary, nevertheless the basis for the distinction could be
more definitely settled. Strangely enough, this aspect of the problem has been
almost neglected by courts and commentators and the available authority is often
curiously confused and contradictory.
The necessity for distinguishing between ordinary and extraordinary divi-
dends first arose in the old English cases, where all ordinary dividends were
awarded to the life tenant and all extraordinary dividends to the corpus. 15 It
is interesting to note in these old cases that the designation placed upon the dis-
tribution of earnings by the corporation was generally regarded as conclusive.
Thus, what the corporation labelled "an extraordinary dividend" or a "bonus"
was awarded to corpus, while what was declared simply as a "dividend" went
to the tenant, with little regard to the form of the payments or their relative
size.' 6 However, this basis for distinguishing ordinary from extraordinary divi-
dends under the rule of equitable apportionment is rarely mentioned by modern
courts,' 7 although it might have an unrecognized effect on modern decisions.
But it is interesting to note that the Restatement of Trusts mentions as one of
the factors to be considered in classifying a dividend "the designation, if any,
placed upon it by the directors of the corporation". 18
Modern courts, in classifying dividends, have been mainly influenced by the
degree of regularity in amount and interval. Thus, ordinary dividends have
been defined as "periodical payments becoming due at fixed intervals", 19 as divi-
dends "regularly declared at uniform intervals and rates theretofore or cus-
tomarily used",20 or as "usual or customary dividends at a fixed per cent or sum
per share, paid at regular periods". 2' It is true that no dividend fulfilling these
requirements would be termed extraordinary. But these definitions are of little
13. In the following cases the problem of allocating dividends was considered for the
first time and the Pennsylvania rule rejected. Powell v. Madison Safe Deposit and Trust
Co., 208 Ind. 432, 196 N. E. 324 (1935) ; In re Joy's Estate, 247 Mich. 418, 225 N. W. 878
(1929) ; Hayes v. St. Louis Union Trust Co., 317 Mo. 1028, 298 S. W. 91 (1927). The Uni-
form Principal and Income Act, 9 U. L. A. 196 (Supp. 1936), is modelled after the Massa-
chusetts rule and has been adopted by two states: 5 ORE. CODE ANN. (Supp. 1935) tit. 63,
§§ 1201-1214; Va. Laws 1936, 1O24. A New York statute, N. Y. CoNs. LAws (Cahill, 193o)
c. 42, § i7a, has provided that all stock dividends must go to corpus regardless of when
earned. True, the RESTATEmENT, TRuSTS (1935) § 236, adopted the Pennsylvania rule, but
see the argument that preceded the adoption of this section, II PRoc. Am. LAw INST. 184
(1934).
I4. See mipra note 13. See also Bryan v. Aikin, io Del. Ch. 446, 465, 86 Atl. 674, 682
(913) ; 4 BOGERT, op. cit. supra note 2, § 857.
15. Brander v. Brander, 4 Ves. 8oo (Ch. 1799).
6. Irving v. Houston, 4 Paton 521 (H. L., Scot. App. 18o3) ; Paris v. Paris, io Ves.
I84a (Ch. 18o4) ("As to the distinction between stock and money, that is too thin."-id at
19o) ; Clayton v. Gresham, io Ves. 287a (Ch. 1804) ; Witts v. Steere, 13 Ves. 363 (Ch.
i8o6) ; Hooper v. Rossiter [1825] M'Clel. 527 (Ex. 1824) ; Price v. Anderson, 15 Sim. 473
(Ch. 1847) ("bonus" of 5% to corpus, although "dividend" of 1212% to tenant) ; Bates v.
Mackinley, 31 Beav. 280 (Ch. 1862) ("bonus" of 649 pounds to corpus, although "dividends"
of 344 and l055 pounds to tenant). Cf. Barclay v. Wainewright, 14 Ves. 66 (Ch. 1807) ;
Preston v. Melville, 16 Sim. 163 (Ch. 1848). These cases have become obsolete with the
decision of Bouch v. Sproule, 12 App. Cas. 385 (887), in which a rule similar to the Massa-
chusetts rule was adopted.
17. But cf. Citizens and So. Nat. Bank v. Fleming, 181 Ga. 116, 181 S. E. 768 (I935).
I8. § 236 (a), comment c (5).
ig. Earp's Appeal, 28 Pa. 368, 374 (1857).
2o. Opperman's Estate (No. I), 319 Pa. 455, 461, I79 Atl. 729, 733 (935).
21. Nirdlinger's Estate, 290 Pa. 457, 462, 139 Atl. 200, 202 (1927).
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value in that they are too narrow to include within their terms dividends which
have been found to be ordinary and non-apportionable. It is clear from the
cases that courts will refuse to apportion dividends whose rate and interval are
neither "fixed", "regular", nor "uniform".2 2 Furthermore, such definitions could
not possibly explain why the payment of accumulated back dividends on pre-
ferred shares should be considered an "ordinary" dividend and not apportioned,
and yet courts that have been presented with this problem have so held.
23
Other elements have entered into the definition of apportionable dividends
but merely with the result of further confusion rather than clarification. The
Restatement of Trusts, for example, after setting forth the rule that ordinary
dividends are not apportionable regardless of the time when the earnings were
made, 24 curiously begs the question by mentioning as one of the factors which
may be of importance in determining whether a dividend is ordinary "the source
of the earnings from which the distribution is made".
25
The most disturbing element in this phase of the law is the emphasis some
courts have placed on the form of the dividend in question-i. e., whether it was
declared in cash or stock. Thus, it has been indicated in Rhode Island that only
unusual cash dividends are apportionable, all stock dividends going to the corpus
regardless of when they are earned by the corporation. 26  On the other hand,
one Maryland case held that only stock dividends were apportionable, all cash
dividends going to the tenantY7 While these decisions can be explained as varia-
tions of the orthodox Pennsylvania doctrine,28 the language of certain opinions
even in Pennsylvania would seem to indicate that no straight cash dividend can
be extraordinary, while stock dividends are apportionable per se. This theory
that the form of the dividend is controlling can be traced to the first Nirdlinger's
Estate where extraordinary dividends are described as those payments which"may assume an unusual form and amount".2 9 Five years later in Waterhouse's
Estate, one finds an unexplained reference to "extraordinary dividends, com-
monly called stock dividends".30 The climax of this tendency to emphasize form
came in the recent case of Nirdlinger's Estate (No. i) where the court declared
that an unusually large dividend could not be considered extraordinary, because
it was paid in cash.21 Furthermore, the language of certain authorities appar-
ently lends support to the converse of this theory by indicating that stock divi-
22. See infra note 54.
23. Thompson v. New York Trust Co., l07 Misc. 245, 177 N. Y. Supp. 299 (Sup. Ct.
igig), aff'd without opinion, 191 App. Div. 904, 181 N. Y. Supp. 956 (ist Dep't, 1920) ;
Crozer's Estate, 27 Pa. D. & C. 179 (1936) ; RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS (935) §236, comments
o and p; Brigham, supra note 2, at 373.
24. RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS (1935) § 236 (a) and comment d.
25. Id., comment c (6). Cf. Matter of Jackson, 135 Misc. 329, 332, 239 N. Y. Supp. 362,
366 (Surr. Ct. 1929), where a dividend was termed extraordinary because it was "a distribu-
tion of assets"-an obvious confusion between liquidating dividends and extraordinary divi-
dends from earnings.
26. Rhode Island Hospital Trust Co. v. Tucker, 51 R. I. 507, 155 Atl. 661 (i93i).
27. Northern Central Dividend Cases, 126 Md. 16, 94 Atl. 338 (1915).
28. The Rhode Island case, supra note 26, is to be explained as an attempt to reconcile
the holding of Rhode Island Hospital Trust Co. v. Peckham, 42 R. I. 365, 107 Atl. 2o9
(1919), which was based on the Pennsylvania rule, with the previously adopted Massachu-
setts rule.
The Maryland case, supra note 27, was plainly out of line with the previous case of
Foard v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 122 Md. 476, 89 Atl. 724 (1914). Neither case has been
expressly overruled, but the orthodox Pennsylvania rule has been set forth in later cases.
See Baldwin v. Baldwin, 159 Md- 175, 178, 150 Atl. 282, 283 (193o). For a review of the
Maryland cases, see (1938) 86 U. OF PA. L. REV. 681.
29. 29o Pa. 457, 462, 139 AtI. 200, 202 (1927).
30. 308 Pa. 422, 428, 162 At. 295, 296 (1932).
31. 327 Pa. i6o, 168, 193 Atl. 33, 37 (I937), 86 U. OF PA. L. REv. iii. Strictly speaking
this was dictum, for the issue was not properly raised on appeal.
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dends are always apportionable. 8 2  Indeed, the theory that form is conclusive
in the classification of dividends might appear to be born out by the fact that
cases in which straight cash dividends have been apportioned are relatively rare.
33
However, the theory that only stock dividends or their equivalents are appor-
tionable is flatly opposed to the Pennsylvania rule as stated by most authorities.
Ever since Earp's Appeal, the courts have consistently declared that the form
of a dividend is immaterial, 4 and it has been on this basis that the Massachu-
setts rule of awarding all stock dividends to corpus and cash to life tenants has
been criticized as arbitrary. 5 The statement that extraordinary dividends are
apportionable "whether they be in cash, or scrip, or stock" 36 has become a by-
word in those states following the Pennsylvania rule. The scarcity of cases
involving extraordinary cash dividends is due not to any widespread legal
principle against apportioning such dividends but to the fact that corporations
rarely have sufficient funds on hand to make large cash distributions. Likewise,
the practice of declaring regular stock dividends of small amounts is quite un-
usual and has arisen as a peculiarly modern phenomenon probably unheard of
by the earlier writers.37 Only one case has been found where such a dividend
was litigated in an apportionment state and there it was treated as an ordinary
dividend and awarded to the life beneficiary without investigation into its
source.
3 8
Thus, authorities are confused as to the factors to be considered in deter-
mining whether a dividend is apportionable, 9 and no satisfactory definition of
32. See HowEs, op. cit. supra note 2, at 28; Evans, supra note 7, at 984.
33. Only four cases have been found where straight cash dividends have been treated as
extraordinary under the Pennsylvania rule: Citizens and So. Nat. Bank v. Fleming, 181 Ga.
i16, I81 S. E. 768 (1935) ; Foard v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 122 Md. 476, 89 AtI. 724
(1914) ; Rhode Island Hospital Trust Co. v. Peckham, 42 R. I. 365, 107 Atl. 209 (1919) ;
Estate of Dittmer, 197 Wis. 304, 222 N. W. 323 (1928) ; cf. Oliver's Estate, 136 Pa. 43, 2o
AtI. 527 (1890). Where cash is distributed with a corresponding allotment of subscription
rights, the courts have not hesitated to grant an apportionment, although a distribution of this
sort might be regarded as in effect a stock dividend. Smith's Estate, 140 Pa. 344, 21 AtI. 438
(1891) ; Stokes' Estate (No. I), 240 Pa. 277, 87 At. 971 (1913) ; Thompson's Estate, 262
Pa. 278, 105 AtI. 273 (1918). Cash liquidation-dividends are of course apportionable but
those are governed by different rules. Vinton's Appeal, 99 Pa. 434 (1882). See also supra
note 8.
34. See Matter of Osborne, 2o9 N. Y. 450, 477, 1O3 N. E. 723, 731 (1913) ; Earp's Ap-
peal, 28 Pa. 368, 374 (1857) ; Wiltbank's Appeal, 64 Pa. 256, 26o (187o) ; Moss's Appeal,
83 Pa. 264, 269 (1877) ; Mandeville's Estate, 286 Pa. 368, 370, 133 AtI. 562, 563 (1926); 7
THOMPSoN, CORPORATIONS (3d ed. 1927) § 5403; Brigham, supra note 2, at 372.
35. See Vinton's Appeal, 99 Pa. 434, 441 (1882) ; Rhode Island Hospital Trust Co. v.
Peckham, 42 R. I. 365, 370, 107 AtI. 2o9, 211 (1919) ; 7 THoMPsoN, op. cit. supra note 34,
§ 5399.
36. Smith's Estate, 140 Pa. 344, 352, 21 AtI. 438 (89).
37. I9 FLETCHER, CO1OATIONS (Perm. ed. 1933) § 9043.
38. Matter of Villard, 147 Misc. 472, 264 N. Y. Supp. 236 (Surr. Ct. 1933) (also held
not subject to the statute allocating all stock dividends to corpus, N. Y. CONS. LAws (Cahill,
1930) c. 42, § 17a). Cf. Rhode Island Hospital Trust Co. v. Tucker, 51 R. I. 507, i55 Atl.
661 (1931), where a regular stock dividend was awarded to corpus following the Massachu-
setts rule. Unless the Massachusetts rule is modified, it will do substantial injustice in these
cases and completely foil the testator's will; see Note (93o) 44 Huwv. L. REV. 101, I03.
39. Incidental to the problem of defining dividends from earnings subject to apportion-
ment, there is the question of how to handle distributions of rights to subscribe to a new
issue of the corporate stock at its par value. There is also a complicated conflict of theories
and decisions on this point. Some authorities have considered them analogous to stock divi-
dends and treated them accordingly. Jones v. Integrity Trust Co., 292 Pa. i49, 14o AtI. 862
(1928); Hostetter's Trust, 319 Pa. 572, i81 AtI. 567 (935). However, other authorities
have insisted that such distributions are in no sense "dividends" and must be regarded as
accretions to capital. Matter of Schley, 202 App. Div. i69, 195 N. Y. Supp. 871 (ist Dep't,
1922), aff' udthout opintion, 234 N. Y. 616, 138 N. E. 469 (1923) ; RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS
(935) § 236c; 2 PERRY, op. cit. mpra note 2, § 546. It is believed that this latter view is the
correct one, in that the surplus account of the corporation is unaffected by the transaction.
For an analysis of the problem of rights, see 4 BOGERT, op. cit. supra note 2, § 854.
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the ternis ordinary and extraordinary has been found. Indeed, the law is not
clear as to how such a definition could be formulated. The problem arises
whether these terms have any factual or economic meaning, or whether their
use in connection with other legal problems could be used as a guide. For in-
stance, the term "ordinary" has been used in connection with the interpreta-
tion of fiduciaries acts which provide for the per diem apportionment of divi-
dends "like interest on money lent".40 These statutory provisions have been con-
strued as applicable only to "ordinary" dividends, or payments at fixed rates
and intervals. 41 Therefore, it was formerly thought that these statutes would
apply to all dividends which were not subject to equitable apportionment, 42 and
that two separate legal incidents would attach to a dividend which was factually
not ordinary; it would not be subject to the statute but would be apportionable
under the rule of Earp's Appeal. Subsequently, however, it was realized that this
was not necessarily So43 and that the term "ordinary" had two separate mean-
ings when applied respectively to the two separate legal problems. A dividend
could be neither "ordinary" in terms of the fiducaries act nor "extraordinary"
in terms of equitable apportionment. The correctness of this latter view hardly
can be seriously questioned, for the degree of regularity required for the appli-
cation of a fiduciaries act has no necessary connection with the degree of irreg-
ularity required for equitable apportionment. Indeed, it might be stated as a
general proposition that legal phrases can have no fixed and absolute meaning
apart from the problem in which they arise.44 Hence, a sound consideration
of the meanings of the terms ordinary and extraordinary with respect to the
doctrine of Earp's Appeal must be based on an examination of fundamental rea-
sons for distinguishing between the two types of payments and for holding that
only extraordinary dividends are apportionable.
It has often been suggested that the theory underlying the rule of appor-
tionment is one of equitable ownership of undistributed profits. Although it is
undisputed that as between corporation and shareholder, undistributed profits
are solely the property of the corporation,45 it is argued that, as between tenant
and remainderman, the latter has an equitable right to the estate's share of the un-
distributed surplus of the corporation as of the date of the creation of the trust.46
On this theory, the refusal to apportion ordinary dividends has frequently been
criticized as contrary to the logic and equity of the Pennsylvania view; 4 and
on this basis certain New Jersey courts have decreed that all dividends should
be apportioned.48  In reply, many authorities, although conceding that the re-
fusal to apportion ordinary dividends is illogical, have justified it on practical
grounds as a rule of convenience to avoid overburdening the courts.
49
40. E. g. Pennsylvania Fiduciaries Act of 1917, § 22, PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 1930)
tit. 20, § 634 (per diem apportionment at death of life beneficiary).
41. See Thompson's Estate, 6 Pa. D. & C. 503, 5o6 (1925) ; Giveri's Estate, 323 Pa. 456,
461, 185 Atl. 778, 780 (936).
42. Flaccus's Estate, 283 Pa 185, 129 Atl. 74 (925).
43. Zell v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 196 Atl. 298 (Md. 1938); Nirdlinger's Estate
(No. I), 327 Pa. i6o, 193 Atl. 33 (1937).
44. See Equitable Trust Co. v. Prentice, 25o N. Y. I, II, 164 N. E. 723, 724 (1928):
"what is income in one relation may at times be principal in another. 'Words', as we are told,
are 'flexible'."
45. See Moss's Appeal, 83 Pa. 264, 269 (877); II FLETCHER, op. cit. supra note 33,
§ 5321.
46. See Earp's Appeal, 28 Pa. 368, 374 (1857). In Nirdlinger's Estate, 29o Pa. 457, 469
et seq., 139 Atl. 200, 205 et seq. (1927), this theory is set forth at some length with quotations
from various other opinions.
47. See Howxs, INcOME AND PRINCIPAL (1905) 25; Note (929) 3 STr. JOHN'S L. REv.
267, 274.
48. See supra note 9.
49. See Earp's Appeal, 28 Pa. 368, 374 (2857) ; McKeown's Estate, 263 Pa. 78, 85, io6
Atl. 289, 191 (2919) ; Okmn and Brandchaft, mpra note 9, at 154.
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Although there is considerable support for this view, it is not one that will
lead to a satisfactory solution to the problem of what dividends should be appor-
tioned. As long as theory and practice are regarded as in conflict, any com-
promise between the two must inevitably be arbitrary. For instance, the solu-
tion suggested in Nirdlinger's Estate (No. i) 5 0 -that only stock dividends will
be apportioned-seems to be an attempt to limit the number of dividends sub-
ject to apportionment on a purely arbitrary basis.
It is believed, however, that the whole philosophy of the equitable-ownership
theory is misleading in that it shifts the emphasis from what should be the pri-
mary consideration of all apportionment questions, namely, the intention of the
testator. The few authorities who have recognized that this intent is the funda-
mental basis of the apportionment doctrine,5 have had little trouble in seeing
that the rule against the apportionment of ordinary dividends is not a rule of
convenience at all but one based on the most reasonable construction of the
testator's will.5 2 When the testator leaves to the life beneficiary the income of
his estate, he plainly means just that, and not the income of the corporation
during the period in question. In referring to the income of his estate, he prob-
ably has in mind dividends similar to those which he was accustomed to receive
during his life, regardless of when the corporation earned them. It is only in
the event of distributions which are plainly beyond the scope of the testator's
probable contemplation that some equitable adjustment is necessary to protect
the rights of the parties. When this occasion arises, the courts try to restore
the intact value of the stock as of the date of the creation of the trust, inasmuch
as it is a fair presumption that the testator intended to leave to the remainder-
man shares of stock of approximately the same value that they had at his death.
With this in mind, it is clear that in order to determine whether a partic-
ular dividend should be apportioned, factors such as the designation placed upon
it by the directors, the source of the dividend, or its form are generally imma-
terial. The important consideration is whether or not the particular dividend
will deplete the corpus of the estate beyond the probable intent of the testator.
Did the testator contemplate a dividend of this nature when he left the income
of his estate to the life tenant? The type of dividend declared on the stock
when owned by the testator becomes significant, for the amount of the disputed
dividend in relation to these past dividends usually will be the controlling factor.
The most obvious exception would be where the corporation makes a payment
of back dividends on preferred shares which have accumulated either before or
after the creation of the trust. Although such a payment would probably be
far out of proportion to previous dividends, it would be correct to regard it as
an ordinary dividend, for even if it accumulated before the creation of the trust,
the settlor would have had reason to contemplate its distribution.
53
It is believed that this view of the problem is in harmony with the factual
holdings, ' 4 if not all the dicta, of the cases. It has been recognized that the defi-
50. 327 Pa. 16o, 168, 193 At. 33, 37 (1937).
51. See Equitable Trust Co. v. Prentice, 25o N. Y. I, 8, 164 N. E. 723, 724 (1928) : "The
search in all these [apportionment] cases was to find the intention of the founder of the trust
and then to give effect to it."
52. See Citizens and So. Nat. Bank v. Fleming, 181 Ga. 116, 118, 181 S. E. 768, 770
(1935) ; Graves v. Graves, 115 N. J. Eq. 547, 552, 171 Atl. 681, 682 (Ch. 1934); Carter v.
Crehore, 12 Hawaii 309, 312 (9oo) ; i MORAWETz, CORPORATIONs (2d ed. 1886) § 466. The
old English view that all ordinary dividends go to tenant was also based on the theory that
the testator would have contemplated ordinary dividends but not bonuses. See Irving v.
Houston, 4 Paton 521, 530 (H. L., Scot. App. 18o3).
53. See supra note 23.
54. Banker's Trust Co. of New York v. Lobdell, 116 N. J. Eq. 363, 173 Atl. 918 (Ch.
1934) (where previous dividends had varied from io% to 2o%, a subsequent 26% dividend
was termed ordinary) ; Hewitt v. Hewitt, 113 N. J. Eq. 299, 166 Atl. 528 (Ch. 1931) (divi-
dends of I2O% annually termed ordinary where there had been previous dividends of that
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nition of dividends subject to apportionment cannot be absolute and must vary
with the facts and circumstances of each individual case.-5  Furthermore, only a
relative definition can obviate the necessity of fixing a static definition of extraor-
dinary dividends which might become obsolete with changing corporate practices.
If relative irregularity governs, in the long run the burden on the courts and
trustees would not be increased when corporations adopt irregular dividend poli-
cies for, in that event, many irregular dividends could properly be considered
"ordinary" in these terms. Although absolute certainty will not be accomplished
in every case, a clarification of the basis of the definition of dividends subject to
apportionment will eliminate much of the existing confusion surrounding the
problem.
P.A.B.
Validity of an Ordinary Bailment Contract Limiting Liability of
Bailee for Negligence '
When a bailee receives possession of the property of another for the benefit
of both parties,2 he will often insist upon a stipulation in the bailment contract
intended to relieve him of liability for negligent injuries to the property while it
is under his control. It is the purpose of the present discussion to ascertain the
effect the courts have given to these stipulations, and to attempt an evaluation
of the present trend of the law with respect to this question. Typical situations
involving the problem are the parking of automobiles on open lots or their storage
in garages; 3 the checking of baggage and parcels in hotel and railroad station
checkrooms; and the storage of various types of merchandise in private ware-
houses.
Typical Contractual Provisions
The usual devices, by which prospective bailees have sought to limit their
liabilities on the bailment contract, have been the posting of large signs in con-
spicuous places and the printing of conditions on the receipt or identification
check given to the bailor upon the transfer of the property involved. It is clear
that a notice by the bailee, intended to limit liability, will be ineffective if com-
amount) ; Nirdlinger's Estate, 26 Pa. D. & C. 3 (1936) (without relying on distinctions in
form, the lower court decided that where past dividends had varied from $5,oo to $,5,O0O,
a subsequent dividend after two years of non-payment of $25,000 was not extraordinary).
55. Nirdlinger's Estate (No. I), 327 Pa. 16o, 169, 193 Atl. 33, 38 (937).
I. A discussion of the liabilities of common carriers, innkeepers, or public warehouse-
men, is not within the scope of this note inasmuch as they involve businesses clearly affected
with a public interest and usually are the subject of statutory regulation. For a thorough
treatment of the instant problem with regard to these types of bailments, see ELLIOTT, BAIL-
MENTS (2d ed. 1929) 9§ 115, 18o et seq. (innkeepers and common carriers) ; GODDAI, BAIL-
MENTS AND CARRIERS (2d ed. 1928) §§ 186, 25o et seq.; 4 WILLISTON, CONTRACTs (Rev. ed.
1936) P. 2926 (public warehousemen) ; Hirsch, Limited Liability of Innkeepers un*der Statu-
tory Regulations (1928) 76 U. OF PA. L. Rxv. 272.
2. The instant problem cannot arise in gratuitous bailments where the promise by the
bailor to relieve the gratuitous bailee of liability for damage to the property lacks considera-
tion and consequently there is no contract to enforce.
3. Where the facts are treated by the court Ns giving rise to a license rather than a bail-
ment, because possession of the chattel was not transferred, the instant problem is not present
because the licensor has no duty to take reasonable care of the chattel. Recent examples of
cases where the court viewed the situation as a license, are Ashby v. Tolhurst, [1937] 2 K. B.
242; Ex Parte Mobile Light & R. R., 211 Ala. 525, IOI So. 177 (i924) ; Suits v. Electric
Park Amusement Co., 213 Mo. App. 275, 249 S. W. 656 (1923); Lord v. Oklahoma State
Fair Ass'n, 95 Okla. 294, 219 Pac. 713 (1923).
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municated subsequent to the completion of the bailment contract.4  However,
there is judicial conflict with respect to the situation involving a notice given in
proper time but not actually received by the bailor. In some jurisdictions, the
receipt by the bailor of a check containing a clause limiting liability will not be
held to impose such a contractual obligation on the bailor, inasmuch as the check
was intended primarily as a token of identification on which an ordinary indi-
vidual would not expect to find a condition of a contract." Stated otherwise,
the mutual assent necessary to the formation of a contract is lacking. A similar
result often obtains where the bailee posts a sign limiting his liability but the
bailor does not read or see it.6 However, there is respectable authority to the
effect that actual notice of the provision limiting liability is unnecessary if, under
all the circumstances, the bailee has taken reasonable steps to give notice.7 This
attitude would appear to be more desirable than the application of arbitrary
distinctions, especially in situations where the bailment agreement is hurriedly
entered into as in the cases of garages, parking lots, checkrooms and similar
establishments. When a large sign has been posted in a conspicuous place and
the condition also has been clearly and legibly printed on the front of the identifi-
cation check, it would unnecessarily burden these enterprises if the bailee were
required to notify each customer individually of the presence of the clause limiting
liability.'
Judicial Attitude Towards the Liability-Exemption Clause
Although the bailee may successfully incorporate a provision limiting liability
into the bailment contract, it does not necessarily follow, as will be later shown,
that the restrictive condition will be everywhere upheld. However, as early as
1815, Lord Ellenborough had held that a provision in a bailment contract limiting
liability for loss by fire was valid and relieved the bailee from responsibility
for any damage by fire irrespective of the cause.9 Since that time, the English
law has become well settled to the effect that an ordinary bailee may contract to
limit his liability for negligence.10 Such provisions have been upheld both as a
valid exercise of the right of the individual to contract without interference and
as a reasonable device for shifting the burden of insurance.
Unfortunately, this phase of the law has not had a uniform development in
the United States. In 1907, Professor Willis, studying this problem, foufld that
the law had not yet crystallized but that most courts regarded provisions limiting
the liability of a bailee as unobjectionable." He predicted that courts would
4. Dale v. See, 51 N. J. L. 378 (Sup. Ct. 1889) ; Cothren v. Kansas City Laundry Serv.
Co., 242 S. W. 167 (Mo. App. 1922) ; BROWN, PERSONAL PROPERTY (1936) § 84.
5. Maynard v. James, io9 Conn. 365, 146 Ati. 614 (929) ; Brown v. Hines, 213 Mo. App.
298, 249 S. W. 683 (1923) ; Healy v. New York Cent. & H. R. R., 153 App. Div. 516, 138 N. Y.
Supp. 287 (3d Dep't, 1912) ; Dodge v. Nashville, C. & St. Louis Ry., i42 Tenn. 20, 215 S. W.
274 (1919).
6. Cascade Auto Co. v. Petter, 72 Colo. 570, 212 Pac. 823 (1923) ; Dietrich v. Peters, 28
Ohio App. 427, 162 N. E. 753 (1928).
7. Missouri Pac. Ry. v. Fuqua, 15o Ark. 145, 233 S. W. 926 (1921) ; U Drive & Tour,
Ltd. v. System Auto Parks, 71 P. (2d) 354 (Cal. App. 1937) ; Noyes v. Hines, 220 Ill. App.
409 (192o); Van Toll v. South Eastern Ry., 12 C. B. N. S. 75 (1862) ; Harris v. Great
Western Ry., i Q. B. D. 515 (1876).
8. For further discussion, in more detail, of this problem, see 6 AM. JuR., BAILMENTS
(937) §§ 77, 178, 189; BROWN, loc. cit. supra note 4; (1935) 20 IoWA L. Rrv. 680; (1923)
22 Micr. L. R v. 154; (1929) 3 U. OF CIN. L. REv. ioi.
9. Maing v. Todd, 4 Campb. 225 (K. B. 1815).
1o. Van Toll v. South Eastern Ry., 12 C. B. N. S. 75 (1862) ; Gibaud v. Great Eastern
Ry., [i921] 2 K. B. 426 (C. A.); Rutter v. Palmer, [1922] 2 K. B. 87 (C. A.).
ii. See Willis, The Right of Bailees to Contract agahist Liability for Negligence (19o7)
20 HA v. L. REv. 297.
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continue to uphold conditions exempting a bailee from liability for negligence
because of the fundamental legal principle that every individual, in the absence
of conflict with public policy, should be free to contract as he pleases.1 2  He
argued that these provisions do not constitute a violation of any rule of public
policy inasmuch as there is no injury to the public welfare but, on the contrary,
only a question of individual property rights.'" Furthermore, since consent has
always been a bar to a tort action, it was argued that no sound reason existed
why it should not constitute a good defense to an action for negligence, as long
as injuries to third parties are not contemplated.14  However, Professor Willis
has not proved to be an able prognosticator for the present holdings are hope-
lessly confused and legal scholars fail to agree as to what constitutes the weight
of authority.15 Seven jurisdictions-Georgia, 16 Illinois,' 7 Indiana,' 8 Oklahoma,"
Oregon,20 Pennsylvania 21 and Washington 22-have definitely committed them-
selves to the proposition that any provision limiting the liability of a bailee for
negligence is invalid. On the other hand, the Federal courts, 23 four states-
Louisiana,24  Missouri,2 5  South Carolina 2 6 and Texas 27---and the English
courts 28 have upheld conditions exempting bailees from responsibility for negli-
gence and have found that they violate no rule of public policy.
The trend of the law in other jurisdictions in which the problem has been
discussed cannot be stated with any degree of certainty. Inferences may be
12. Id. at 301.
13. Ibid.
14. Id. at 302.
i5. Compare 6 Am. JuR., BAILMENTS (1937) §§ 176, 184; 2 BERRY, AUTOMOBILES (6th
ed. z929) § 1627; BROWN, op. cit supra note 4, at § 84, with ELLIOTT, op. cit. supra note I,
§ 18; 15-16 HUDDY, AUTOMOBILE LAW (9th ed. 1931) 70; i PAGE, CONTRACTS (2d ed. Supp.
1929) § 766.
16. Renfroe v. Fouche, 26 Ga. App. 340, io6 S. E. 303 (i92I), apparently overruling,
Evan & Pennington v. Nail, I Ga. App. 42, 57 S. E. 1020 (1907).
17. Weinberger v. Werremeyer, 224 Ill. App. 217 (1922); cf. Noyes v. Hines, 22o Ill.
App. 409 (1920) (railroad checkroom permitted to limit liability to certain amount).
I8. Glazer v. Hook, 74 Ind. App. 497, 129 N. E. 249 (1920) ; Keenan Hotel Co. v. Funk,
93 Ind. App. 677, 177 N. E. 364 (I931).
ig. Scott Auto & Sup. Co. v. McQueen, III Okla. 107, 226 Pac. 372 (1924) (statute
prescribing common law duty of bailees held to define public policy against liability-exemp-
tion provision) ; cf. Inland Compress Co. v. Simmons, 59 Okla. 287, 159 Pac. 262 (i916).
20. Pilson v. Tip-Top Auto Co., 67 Ore. 528, 136 Pac. 642 (1913) ; see Simms v. Sulli-
van, ioo Ore. 487, 493, 198 Pac. 240, 242 (1921).
21. Baione v. Heavey, 103 Pa. Super. 529, 158 Atl. 181 (1932) ; Wendt v. Sley System
Garages, 124 Pa. Super. 224, 188 Atl. 624 (936) ; Downs v. Sley System Garages, 129 Pa.
Super. 68, 194 Atl. 772 (i937).
22. Sporsem v. First Nat. Bank of Poulsbo, 133 Wash. 199, 233 Pa. 641 (1925).
23. McCormick v. Shippy, 124 Fed. 48 (C. C. A. 2d, i9o3) ; Interstate Compress Co. v.
Agnew, 255 Fed. 508 (C. C. A. 8th, I919) ; Fidelity Storage Co. v. Kingsbury, 76 F. (2d)
978 (App. D. C. 1935) ; see also Santa Fe, P. & P. Ry. v. Grant Bros. C. Co., 228 U. S. 177
(1913).
24. Automobile Underwriters of America v. Laughlin, 6 La. App. 67 (1927) ; see Marks
v. New Orleans Cold Storage Co., T07 La. 172, ,8o, 31 So. 671, 674 (igoi) ; cf. Woodward
v. Royal Carpet Cleaning Co., 16 La. App. 555, 134 So. 443 (193i). But see Williams v.
H. L. Weil Co., I La. App. i88, i9o (1924).
25. Gashweiler v. Wabash, St. Louis & Pac. Ry., 83 Mo. 112 (1884); Wells v. Porter,
I69 Mo. 252, 69 S. W. 282 (1902) semble.
26. Terry v. Southern Ry., 8i S. C. 279, 62 S. E. 249 (i9o8) ; Marlow v. Conway Iron
Works, 130 S. C. 256, 125 S. E. 569 (1924).
27. Coffield v. Harris, 2 Tex. Civ. App. 273 (1884) ; Munger Auto Co. v. American
Lloyds, 267 S. W. 304 (Tex. Civ. App. 1924). But cf. Langford v. Nevin, 117 Tex. 130,
298 S. W. 536 (1927).
28. See cases cited supra note io. See also in accord RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS (932)
§§ 574, 575.
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drawn from decisions in Mississippi,2" New York 3 0 and Tennessee 
3 1 that these
courts would uphold a liability exemption condition if presented with the issue.
Conflict within each jurisdiction is found in California,2 Minnesota 3 and
Ohio.34  However, in Alabama,3 5 Arkansas,3 6 Colorado," Michigan
38  and
Nebraska,3 9 it has been indicated that such provisions are regarded with disfavor.
In view of these additional unfavorable dicta, a statement might be hazarded that
a slight weight of authority regards such restrictive stipulations to be contrary to
public policy. 0
Furthermore, many courts have been reluctant to interpret a provision
limiting liability for damage as referring to negligence. 41 The opportunity for
applying such a strict rule of construction has resulted from the broad, general
language in which the condition limiting liability has been phrased, such as,
"property is at owner's risk", or "not responsible for damage from fire or theft",
without any reference to negligent injuries. It is true that an owner of property
will not ordinarily forego his right to compensation for injuries which may result
from the negligence of another. Therefore, a bailor will not be held to have
intended to exempt the bailee from liability for negligence unless the language
of the alleged condition is direct and unambiguous. Thus, the provision will not
be construed to cover negligent injuries where another interpretation is reason-
ably possible.4 2  Thus stated, the principles propounded seem dear. However,
the soundness of their application in the present situation is doubtful inasmuch
as the limiting condition is rendered meaningless unless construed to include
freedom from liability for negligent conduct. It is well settled that, without the
provision, a bailee is not responsible for damage unless he has been negligent.43
29. Van Noy Interstate Co. v. Tucker, 125 Miss. 260, 87 So. 643 (192).
3o. Herzig v. New York Cold Storage Co., 115 App. Div. 40, IO N. Y. Supp. 603 (2d
Dep't, i9o6); Healy v. New York Cent. & H. R. R., 153 App. Div. 516, 138 N. Y. Supp. 287
(3d Dep't, 1912); Galowitz v. Magner, 208 App. Div. 6, 203 N. Y. Supp. 42i (2d Dep't,
1924).
31. Memphis & C. R. R. v. Jones, 2 Head 517 (Tenn. 1859).
32. Compare Northwestern Mut. Fire Ass'n v. Pacific Wharf & Storage Co., 187 Cal.
38, 200 Pac. 934 (1921) (liability-exemption provision upheld as an exception to general rule
against such provisions because of disorganized business situation due to labor strike);
U Drive & Tour, Ltd. v. System Auto Parks, 71 P. (2d) 354 (Cal. App. 1937), 22 M.AnQ. L.
R-v. 57, with Taussig v. Bode & Haslett, 134 Cal. 260, 66 Pac. 259 (I9oi) ; Dieterle v. Bekin,
143 Cal. 683, 77 Pac. 664 (904).
33. Compare Minnesota Butter & Cheese Co. v. St. Paul Cold-Storage Co., 75 Minn.
445, 447, 77 N. W. 977, 978 (I899), with Smith v. Library Board of Minneapolis, 58 Minn.
io8, 111, 59 N. W. 979, 98o (1894).
34. Compare Hotels Statler Co. v. Safier, 103 Ohio St. 638, 134 N. E. 460 (192i), with
inferences in favor of liability-exemption provision to be drawn from Dietrich v. Peters, 28
Ohio App. 427, 162 N. E. 753 (x928) ; Union Bus Station v. Etosh, 48 Ohio App. 161, I92N. E. 743 (Q933).
35. See Ex Parte Mobile Light & R. R., 211 Ala. 525, 527, 101 So. 177, 179 (1924).
36. See Gulf Compress Co. v. Harrington, 9o Ark. 256, 119 S. W. 249 (909) ; Missouri
Pac. Ry. v. Fuqua, 15o Ark. 145, 233 S. W. 926 (1921).
37. See Parris v. Jaquith, 70 Colo. 63, 67, 197 Pac. 750, 752 (1920); Denver Union
Terminal Ry. v. Cullinan, 72 Colo. 248, 250, 2io Pac. 602, 603 (1922).
38. See Rudell v. Grand Rapids Cold Storage Co., 136 Mich. 538, 99 N. W. 756 (I9O4).
39. See Gesford v. Star Van & Storage Co., io4 Neb. 453, 456, 177 N. W. 794, 795
(1920).
40. No cases have been found on this point in other jurisdictions.
41. Gulf Compress Co. v. Harrington, 90 Ark. 256, ig9 S. W. 249 (i9o9); Denver Public
Warehouse Co. v. Munger, 20 Colo. App. 56, 77 Pac. 5 (19o4) ; Marks v. New Orleans Cold
Storage Co., 107 La. 172, 31 So. 671 (Igoi) ; Minnesota Butter & Cheese Co. v. St. Paul
Cold-Storage W. Co., 75 Minn. 437, 77 N. W. 977 (1899) ; Herzig v. New York Cold Stor-
age Co., 115 App. Div. 40, ioo N. Y. Supp. 603 (2d Dep't, 1906) ; Langford v. Nevin, 117 Tex.
330, 298 S. W. 536 (1927).
42. See cases cited supra note 41.
43. BROWN, op. cit. supra note 4, § 8L
UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
Therefore, it seems evident that general language such as "not responsible for
damage to the property" is intended to mean damage for which the bailee would
otherwise be legally accountable. 44  Likewise, it seems clear that a contract
exempting liability for damage from certain enumerated causes, such as fire or
theft, refers to fire or theft resulting from the negligence of the bailee. Therefore,
courts which have emasculated liability-exemption conditions by such a limited
construction of the contract evidently have found this device to be a convenient
subterfuge for invalidating stipulations limiting liability for negligence. 45
Desirability of Enforcement
Although judicial decisions invalidating provisions limiting the liability of a
bailee rarely contain more than a brief discussion of the merits of the problem,
courts apparently fear that judicial recognition of such provisions will tend to
encourage negligence among bailees, to the public detriment.46 This argument,
theoretically compelling, if found to be sound practically, constitutes a real objec-
tion to the validity of such contractual obligations. Furthermore, it is occasion-
ally stated that a person may not contract away a duty imposed by law but only
those which arise out of his contractual relations.4 7  The establishment of a legal
duty upon individual members of society expresses the policy of the law with
respect to that matter and two persons may not agree to abrogate that duty
without violating public policy.
As stated, these propositions are not very helpful in the solution of the
present problem. A closer analysis will show them to be misleading. First of
all, tort duties are imposed by law, as a result of some relationship which the
actor bore to the injured party.48  Yet, instances exist in which courts have
permitted contractual limitations on the individual's liability for breach of these
duties. Thus, landlords have been permitted to limit their liability to tenants
for defective premises,-19 and railroads as lessors have successfully exempted
themselves from liability to their lessees for negligent fires caused by passing
locomotives.5 0  It has been suggested -1 that these cases may be supported as
44. Santa Fe, P. & P. Ry. v. Grant Bros. C. Co., 228 U. S. 177 (1913) (common carrier
acting as private bailee) ; McCormick v. Shippy, 124 Fed. 48 (C. C. A. 2d, 19o3) ; Berwind
White C. M. Co. v. United States, 15 F. (2d) 366 (C. C. A. 2d, 1926); Rosin & T. Imp.
Co. v. B. Jacob & Sons, 1O2 L. T. R. (N. s.) 81 (H. L. igio) ; Gibaud v. Great Eastern Ry.,
[1921] 2 K. B. 426 (C. A.); Rutter v. Palmer, [1922] 2 K. B. 87 (C. A.).
45. This situation was recognized by one court, but it still went on to hold that the
liability-exemption clause did not include negligence, Gulf Compress Co. v. Harrington, 9o
Ark. 256, 119 S. W. 249 (19o9). However, another jurisdiction which had already upheld
the validity of a condition limiting liability against negligence, Munger Auto Co. v. American
Lloyds, 267 S. W. 304 (Tex. Civ. App. 1924), without directly prejudicing this decision, now
interprets such provisions as not intended to refer to negligence unless it is so stated in apt
words, Langford v. Nevin, 117 Tex. 130, 298 S. W. 536 (1927).
46. This argument has not been found in any of the bailment cases, but has been ex-
pressed in other cases in which contracts limiting liability for negligence have been inval-
idated. See, e. g., Murphy v. City of Indiana, 158 Ind. 238, 141, 63 N. E. 469, 470 (19o2).
In 3 COOLEY, TORTS (4th ed. 1932) p. 46o, there is the following approximate expression of
this viewpoint: "But although the reasons which forbid such contracts have special force in
the business of carrying persons and goods, and of sending messages, they apply universally,
and should be held to defeat all contracts by which a party undertakes to put another at the
mercy of his own faulty conduct."
47. See Otis Elevator Co. v. Maryland Cas. Co., 75 Colo. 99, 107, 33 P. (2d) 974, 977
(1934); Goldman v. White & Davis Inv. Co., 225 Mo. App. 1023, 1028, 38 S. W. (2d) 62,
65 (1931).
48. BOHLEN, STUDIES IN THE LAW OF TORTS (192 6 ) 45.
49. Inglis v. Garland, i Cal. App. (2d) 767, 64 P. (2d) 50, (1936) ; Weirick v. Hamm
Realty Co., 179 Minn. 25, 228 N. W. 175 (1929). See also Note (933) 84 A. L. R. 654.
50. Frederick v. Great Northern Ry., 207 Wis. 234, 24o N. W. 387 (1932). See also
Note (1927) 48 A. L. R. 1003.
51. See (1936) 36 COL. L. REv. 994.
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analogous to contracts indemnifying against non-wilful torts,52 or providing for
liquidated damages.53 Furthermore, since a primary purpose of tort liability for
negligence involves the compensation of the injured party for the damage suf-
fered, 4 it would seem reasonable to allow him to forego for an adequate con-
sideration his right to reimbursement for such injuries as long as no public
interest is violated. In this connection, it should be noted that the bailor has
ample opportunity, in the usual case, to refuse to accept a condition limiting
liability. As has already been indicated, the bailee must take reasonable steps
to notify the bailor of any special terms offered as part of the contract. Other-
wise, the bail6r is not bound by the attempted contractual limitation.5  Upon
receiving notice of the immunity clause, should he fail to agree with the bailee
as to its inclusion in the contract, he is free to take his trade elsewhere. In
this respect, the ordinary bailment situation differs from that of the common
carrier and other public utilities.56 The latter, as bailees, have superior bargain-
ing powers as far as the public is concerned by virtue of their monopoly on the
supply of goods or services offered for sale. It is a simple matter for powerful
utilities to compel bailors either to accept limiting provisions or do without the
goods or services in question. As a result, courts have generally denied public
utilities the right to limit their liability for negligence.57
However, in an ordinary bailment transaction, clauses limiting liability for
negligence should be upheld until it clearly appears that the theoretical encour-
agement of negligence alleged to result from these provisions is supported by
business experience and that there is no stronger public policy overbalancing
this alleged harmful tendency. Liability, resulting in money damages, is cer-
tainly not the only deterrent to negligence on the part of bailees. A more im-
portant factor encouraging due care on the part of bailees will be found in the
pressure of daily competitive business. It seems unlikely that contemporary
business men would take advantage of the immunity clause by careless treatment
of their customers' property. Moreover, whatever tendency to harm the public
lurks in the recesses of such provisions must be balanced against a strong public
attitude favoring freedom of contract. "If there is one thing more than any
other which public policy requires, it is that men of full age and competent under-
standing shall have the utmost liberty of contracting, and that contracts when
entered into freely and voluntarily, shall be held good and shall be enforced by
courts of justice." 58 As a result, courts generally are reluctant to invalidate con-
tracts in the absence of a provision clearly violating some positive rule of law
or public interest. 5 Public policy has always been considered a precarious term
since, if loosely applied, it may become a scapegoat for all types of improprieties
in the administration of justice.6 0 Courts have tended to be strict in their use
of this device as an invalidating weapon and, wherever possible, have construed
contracts in their most favorable light so as to hold them valid.61 Therefore,
before a court will invalidate a contract on the basis of public policy, every
52. See (1920) 20 COL. L. REV. 218; (I908) 22 HARV. L. REV. 306.
53. See 2 WILLIST N, CONTRACTS § 777.
54. HARPER, TORTS (933) § 2.
55. See supra notes 4, 5, 6, 7, 8.
56. See supra note I.
57. ELLIOTT, BAILMENTS (2d ed. 1929) § i8o.
58. 5 WILLIsTON, CONTRACTS § 1629A, quoting Sir George Jessel in Printing, etc., Co.
v. Sampson, L. R. i9 Eq. 426, 465 (1875).
59. See Baltimore & Ohio Ry. v. Voight, 176 U. S. 498, 505 (899); Weirick v. Hamm
Realty Co., 179 Minn. 25, 28, 228 N. W. 175, 176 (1929) ; 5 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § i629A.
6o. See Winfield, Public Policy in the English Common Law (1928) 42 H Iv. L. REv.
76, 9.
61. See Stephens v. Southern Pac. Ry., io9 Cal. 86, 89, 41 Pac. 783, 784 (i895) ; 5 WIL-
LISTON, CONTRAcs § i629A.
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possible ground for supporting the provision must have failed. Certainly, this
should not be so with respect to a provision of a bailment contract limiting the
liability of a bailee for negligence. Public policy usually is held to refer to some
established interest of society.6 2  It is a flexible device varying with the times
but always concerned with the public welfare. 63 However, contracts exempting
a bailee from liability for negligence are primarily concerned with individual
property rights and the alleged tendency to encourage negligence thus is over-
balanced by the greater interest in the freedom to bargain as one pleases.
64
Furthermore, the purpose of the immunity clause may have beneficial
aspects. In many instances, the bailee is to have possession of the property for
a very short period of time receiving, in return for his services, a very small fee.
To a great extent, the size of the fee reflects the intent of the parties with
respect to the degree of care expected of the bailee. Therefore, it is reasonable that
the bailee should correspondingly be able to reduce his legal responsibility to a
minimum. 65 Often, the inclusion of the liability exemption clause is a factor
enabling the bailee to charge a smaller fee for his services.66 The parties them-
selves, in the absence of statute, should be permitted to decide the amount of the
fee and the nature of the risk assumed.
Viewing the problem in another light, some authorities 67 have regarded
the provision limiting the bailee's responsibility as merely a means of shifting
the burden of insurance. This would appear to be a rational attitude. In most
cases, it is easier for the owner to underwrite the common risks to which his
property is subjected than for the bailee to insure all property passing through
his hands at different times. Inasmuch as this extra burden on the owner may
be compensated by a reduction in the fee of the bailee, a strong argument is pre-
sented for permitting the parties to handle the problem of burden of risk in this
manner.
Quasi-Public Enterprises
This more liberal viewpoint is applicable in most ordinary bailment situa-
tions such as garages and private warehouses. The railroad station checkroom
deserves special treatment. It differs from the ordinary bailment due to the
quasi-public nature of the business.6 8 Situated as it is in the business establish-
ment of a public utility, it may more easily coerce the public into accepting its
own terms, in view of the inconvenience to the traveler and, often, the impossi-
bility of making other arrangements. As a result, in this situation, public policy
should prevent the enforcement of stipulations restrictive of tort liability. How-
ever, where the value of the goods is undeclared, he should be allowed to limit
his responsibility to a certain amount 69 in order to prevent the concealment of
62. See Nichols v. Hitchcock Motor Co., 70 P. (2d) 654, 658 (Cal. App. 1937); GREEN-
HaOOD, PUBLIC POLICY (1886) I; Willis, supra note ii, at 3Ol.
63. See supra note 62.
64. See Santa Fe, P. & P. Ry. v. Grant Bros. C. Co., 228 U. S. 177, 188 (1913); Willis,
supra note II, at 301.
65. Noyes v. Hines, 22o Ill. App. 4o9 (1920); Van Toll v. South Eastern Ry., 12 C. B.
N. S. 75 (1862).
66. See Harris v. Great Western Ry., i Q. B. D. 515 (1876) ; Gibaud v. Great Eastern
Ry., [1921] 2 K. B. 426 (C. A.).
67. McCormick v. Shippy, 124 Fed. 48 (C. C. A. 2d, 19o3); Newport News S. & D. D.
Co. v. United States, 34 F. (2d) OO (C. C. A. 4th, 1929) ; Rosin & Turpentine Import Co.
v. B. Jacob & Sons, 102 L. T. R. 81 (H. L. 191o); Rutter v. Palmer, [1922] 2 I. B. 87
(C. A.).
68. See Inland Compress Co. v. Simmons, 59 Okla. 287, 159 Pac. 262 (1916), in which
the court treated a cotton warehouse and compress company as a public business and inval-
idated the exemption provision.
69. Noyes v. Hines, 220 Ill. App. 4o9 (1920); Terry v. Southern Ry., 81 S. C. 279, 62
S. E. 249 (19o8); Van Toll v. South Eastern Ry., 12 C. B. N. S. 75 (1862).
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valuables, increasing his risk and subjecting him to the possibility of fabricated
claims. However, when the value of the baggage is declared, these dangers are
minimized inasmuch as the bailee is able to increase his charge in proportion to
the added risk assumed.70
Conclusion
In retrospect, the confusion reigning in this field of law appears to be chiefly
the result of two factors. First, the unreasonable refusal of many courts to
interpret a provision, generally limiting the liability of a bailee to include negli-
gence, has greatly obstructed a logical development in this phase of the law.
Furthermore, the apparent failure of most courts to investigate fully the essential
considerations involved and the absence of a stated basis for the contemporary
judical attitude toward the problem, has created uncertainty among authorities
and confusion as to the guiding principles to be applied in the settlement of similar
problems in the future. Finally, with the exception of the quasi-public bailee,
a variety of strong legal and economic arguments demand that such contract
stipulations be upheld as a rational method of attaining desirable ends.
L.S.F.
7o. Missouri Pac. Ry. v. Fuqua, 15o Ark. 145, 233 S. W. 926 (I92) ; Harris v. Great
Western Ry., i Q. B. D. 515 (1876); Gibaud v. Great Eastern Ry., [1921] 2 K. B. 426
(C. A.).
